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Discourse, affect and affliction 
Eeva Sointu 
 
 
Abstract  
While much recent theorizing into affect has challenged the primacy of discourse in 
understanding social life, this paper is premised on the intertwining of affective 
experience with discursive meaning. Furthermore, appreciating the entwining of 
affect and discourse facilitates broader understanding into the illness experience, 
medical decision-making and experiences of healing. Today, the biomedical discourse 
carries particular affective weight that can saturate experiences of affliction. Cultural 
understandings of disease similarly shape affect that may emerge in affliction. Social 
meaning, more specifically stereotypes pertaining to identities, interweave with 
emotion also in the context of medical practice. The doctor-patient relationship is an 
affect-laden encounter where the entwining of affect with social assumptions carries 
important, yet poorly understood, repercussions for treatment decisions and for the 
furthering of health inequalities. Both the elusiveness and the power of affect that 
unfolds in relation to discursive meaning rest on the way in which affect dwells in and 
resounds through the body.  
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Introduction 
Affect has emerged as an important theme in social and cultural theory in recent years 
(Wetherell 2012; Blackman and Cromby 2007; Cromby 2007a; Leys 2011; Burkitt 
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2014; Papoulias and Callard 2010). The term affect features in a wide array of 
scholarly writing, developed in disciplines ranging from neuroscience to cultural 
studies and from philosophy to human geography. Much of this work centres on 
outlining and analysing the manner in which affect Ð ranging from Ôbasic emotionsÕ 
such as anger, joy and fear, to more ineffable and fleeting affective experiences of, for 
example, apprehension, pity, disappointment, shame, excitement or hope Ð permeates 
lives and bodies, yet also eludes conscious reflection as well as more traditional 
means of interpreting social life (Wetherell 2012; Leys 2011; Papoulias and Callard 
2010). Much theorizing into affect has posited that Ôaffects must be viewed as 
independent of, and in an important sense prior to, ideologyÕ (Leys 2011:437). 
Accordingly, as Leys (2011:437) summarizes, affects are thought to exist and exert 
influence Ôbelow the threshold of conscious awareness and meaning.Õ The Ôturn to 
affectÕ has thus centred on leaving behind theoretical landscapes where discourse 
occupies a paramount position; the affective dimensions of being-in-the-world are 
thought to escape poststructuralist analyses of social dynamics. Within these 
arguments, discourse is seen to constitute Ôthe conscious, the planned and the 
deliberateÕ other to affect that is conceptualised Ôas the automatic, the involuntary and 
the non-representationalÕ (Wetherell 2012:52). Affect promises something novel 
because it Ôseems to index a realm beyond talk, words and texts, beyond epistemic 
regimes, and beyond conscious representation and cognition.Õ (Wetherell 2012:19; see 
also Leys 2011; Papoulias and Callard 2010; Burkitt 2014).  
 
Despite the desire to leave discourse behind that is expressed in some scholarship into 
affect (Thrift 2008; Clough 2008, 2010; Massumi 1995), rather than Ôproceeding 
directly from the bodyÕ (Papoulias and Callard 2010:35 emphasis original), affect 
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entwines with the social and the representational. Affective responses from happiness 
to abhorrence dwell in and suffuse the body, but also intertwine with changing social 
and cultural meaning. Feelings, as Sara Ahmed points out, Ôrehearse associations that 
are already in placeÕ (Ahmed 2004a:39) and emerge Ôfrom the thickness of sociality 
itself.Õ (Ahmed 2004:28). Affective experience Ôintertwines with cultural circuits of 
valueÕ as social and cultural ideas about people, behaviours and issues imbue 
embodied affective responses (Wetherell 2012:16; Cromby 2007a, 2011). Affect thus 
echoes through the very personal Ð bodily and ordinary Ð at the same time as 
seemingly private affective responses capture broader social and cultural 
interpretations attached to people, bodies, and places (Wetherell 2012; Seyfert 2012; 
Ahmed 2004a, 2004b). Affect calls on previous experience and social meaning even 
when it bypasses conscious representational registers (Cromby 2007a, 2011; Clough 
2008; Blackman and Venn 2010).  
 
Affect suffuses the flow of everyday life, shaping even the most seemingly rational 
decisions and choices (Cromby 2007a). The manner in which feeling permeates 
experience and thinking is, however, antithetical to the valorisation of the rational 
agent in Western science and philosophy (Cromby 2007a; Wetherell 2012; Faircloth 
2011; Reber 2012). However, despite the capacity of eluding conscious reflection, 
and despite the historical marginalization of emotion especially in the West, affect is 
central to the lived experience (Cromby 2007a, 2011; Illouz 2007). We feel our way 
through the world (Cromby 2007a) even when the role of emotion in individual action 
is cast in negative terms and even though the importance of affect in shaping personal 
experience, as well as the social, may be hidden from conscious deliberation. 
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Experiences of affliction and impairment are also saturated with affect. As John 
Cromby notes: 
There is a stark affective dimension to our responses to illness 
and mortality, within which both our own experiences and 
those of our loved ones come to figure in ways that are 
inescapably and often profoundly emotional. (Cromby 
2011:81).  
Illness can set one afloat in a world traversed by the healthy only by association, a 
world controlled by medical appointments and procedures and, in many cases, by 
limitation and loss. Affect imbues episodes of ill health because illness can disrupt so 
much of what is ordinarily taken for granted; ill health accentuates the lack of control 
and predictability in life (Frank 1995; Charmaz 1983, 1995). Ill health can restrict 
activity, as well as give rise to experiences of isolation. These features of ill health 
can amount to nothing less than a Ôloss of selfÕ as identities built upon old capacities 
and possibilities crumble away (Charmaz 1983). Ill health not only alters oneÕs 
relationship with oneself and with oneÕs body, ill health can also change the manner 
in which we relate to others (Frank 1995; Charmaz 1983). Affect in affliction 
entwines with the profound change, uncertainty, loss and chaos that illness can 
generate. Affect in affliction also captures the body Ð that ordinarily silently facilitates 
and grounds being (Leder and Krucoff 2008; Williams and Bendelow 1998) Ð 
claiming a more prominent position in conscious experience through embodied as 
well as emotional discomfort and dread.  
 
Despite the centrality of emotion in responses to ill health, and in processes of 
recovery, the affect that suffuses affliction escapes definitions of disease generated 
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through the biomedical discourse Ð the dominant means of making sense of health and 
illness today (Stacey 1997; Lupton 2012). Affect that saturates affliction remains 
marginal, if not invisible, in biomedical definitions of disease
i
. While powerful and 
valuable, the ÔphysicalistÕ (Harrington 2008) understandings of affliction sidestep the 
affective valence of ill health that often constitutes the very core of the illness 
experience.  
 
Importantly, social scientific understandings of discourse can also fall short in 
capturing the deep emotional resonance of illness; the lived experience of ill health 
entails more than discourses through which ailments are produced. Even though pain 
may be Ôculturally shapedÕ it simultaneously Ôresists language,Õ escaping capacities 
for expression (Scarry 2007:65). Affect in affliction can remain an uncharted territory 
in poststructuralist analyses that, similarly to the biomedical discourse, lack the 
conceptual means of recognising and making sense of the affective depths of illness. 
While illness entails more than discourses naming and defining forms of affliction, 
discourses are, however, acutely relevant in the generation of affect in affliction.  
 
This paper highlights the importance of discourse Ð the representational and 
ideological Ð in the generation of affective experience. I argue that affect in affliction 
unfolds in relation to discursive meaning. Furthermore, understanding the ways in 
which affect and discourse intertwine facilitates broader understanding into the illness 
experience as well as the reproduction of inequality in medicine. To show how 
discourse and affect intertwine, I will discuss diagnosis, stigma, and the doctor-patient 
relationship. These examples relate to central themes within the sociology of health 
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and illness: the illness experience, the therapeutic encounter, and the reproduction of 
inequality.  
 
In a social context where biomedicine constitutes the primary framework for defining 
and treating ill health (Stacey 1997; Lupton 2012) the biomedical discourse carries 
particular affective weight. Cultural interpretations of affliction Ð including health-
related stigma Ð are also important in the generation of affect during episodes of 
illness. Social and cultural understandings of affliction are not, however, the only 
forms of discourse that shape the affective landscapes of illness and medicine. Social 
assumptions related to identities matter also. The doctor-patient relationship is an 
affect-laden encounter where the social subtly entwines with the emotional. The 
intertwining of affect with assumptions Ð related to, for example, understandings of 
responsibility, deservedness and capacity Ð carries important repercussions for the 
doctor-patient relationship and for treatment decisions. Furthermore, the entwining of 
affect with medical decision-making can serve to further health inequalities. Finally, I 
consider how affect saturates affliction. I argue that the manner in which affect dwells 
in and resounds through the body makes the affect emerging in illness and in 
medicine both powerful as well as elusive. The discussion into the manner in which 
affect imbues affliction draws from affective neuroscience and, in particular, the work 
of Antonio Damasio (1994, 1999). I draw on this work to provide tentative avenues 
for analysing how affective experience unfolds, also after the original affective event 
has passed. I am, however, mindful that there are problems in DamasioÕs account of 
affect, especially in terms of his understanding of emotion as an automatic and 
universal evolutionary biological process (Papoulias and Callard 2010:41; Wetherell 
2012; Burkitt 2014). 
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In my argument, following Wetherell (2012), I understand discourse as institutionally 
located systems of knowledge, such as the biomedical discourse, as well as discourse 
as meaning-making that patterns everyday life. I conceptualize affect to encompass 
the Ôbasic emotionsÕ of psychological frameworks such as sadness and anger. 
However, rather than something internal, and primarily neuropsychological, affect 
and emotion arise from and entwine with Ôa context, a set of circumstances and 
relationships with others and things.Õ (Burkitt 2014:8). While I often use terms affect 
and emotion interchangeably, by affect I am referring to Ôa feeling or emotion that 
takes us or moves us in ways that we cannot help or prevent.Õ (Burkitt 2014:10 
emphasis original). Affect denotes visceral and at times ineffable feeling that 
resonates through individual and social life (Wetherell 2012). Simultaneously, I 
understand affect, feeling and emotion as central to experience. As Cromby 
(2007a:102) notes, feelings amount to Ôthe raw stuff from which experience is 
primordially constitutedÕ, so much so that Ôthe very fabric of our being is thoroughly 
imbued with their texture, valence and affordances.Õ (Cromby 2007a:102).  
 
Context: biomedical dominance 
Much of our capacity of making sense of health, illness and healing is shaped by the 
dominance of biomedicine as the primary means of defining and treating ill health. 
The biomedical manner of understanding disease is premised on conceptualising 
disease as Ôan intra-corporal lesion or abnormalityÕ (Armstrong 2011:802) that Ôcan be 
located within the anatomical frameÕ (Nettleton 2006:1168; see also Foucault 1973).  
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Clearly, the above summary constitutes a flagrant simplification of a complex and 
fragmented field (Berg and Mol 1998). The history of biomedicine is marked by 
critiques of the kind of reductionism that locates disease solely within the physical 
frame and that understands the key to addressing ill health to lie solely in the expert 
hands of the doctor (Lawrence and Weisz 1998; Harrington 2008). Today, various 
sub-fields of medicine, such as public health and behavioural medicine, underscore 
the social and environmental causes of ill health (Keefe 2011; Porter 1999; Wilkinson 
and Pickett 2010). More psychologically oriented specialties have also long 
recognised the complex and blurry relationship between the social, the emotional and 
the biological. To add to the ontological diversity within biomedical institutions, 
different medical specialties and medical practitioners, from surgeons to nurses, to 
midwifes, to physiotherapists, to psychologists Ð the list could be extended 
considerably Ð can hold widely differing views of illness, health and suffering (Berg 
and Mol 1998). However, while there is, as Beg and Mol have pointed out, 
Ômultiplicity even inside medicineÕs biomedical ÒcoreÓÕ (Berg and Mol 1998:3), 
biomedical knowledge is predicated upon an emphasis on scientific certainty and an 
impetus to not only locate disease within the body but also to understand it in terms of 
physiological functioning that is captured, in its most truthful form, in the knowing 
gaze of a biomedical expert (Nettleton 2006; Armstrong 2011; Foucault 1973, 1977). 
Disease is, as such, produced as a specific malady through the application of 
biomedical knowledge; the biomedical discourse translates a concern into biomedical 
language and, through this, bestows an ailment biomedical meaning and significance. 
Classification of ill health is, simultaneously, intertwined with social categories as 
well as socially situated assessment of what constitutes disease (Jutel 2012:3). Both, 
the biomedical manner of locating disease within the physiological body (Nettleton 
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2006; Armstrong 2011) and social meaning associated with disease are meaningful 
for the generation of affect in affliction.    
 
Importantly, within the context of biomedical dominance, experiences of illness and 
healing that escape biomedical explanatory frameworks risk being rendered invisible 
(Nettleton 2006; Jutel and Nettleton 2011; Jutel 2012); as Foucault has argued, Ô[t]hat 
which is not on the scale of the gaze falls outside the domain of possible knowledgeÕ 
(Foucault 1973:166). Furthermore, despite its social, cultural and institutional 
importance, the biomedical discourse can fall short in capturing the affective 
magnitude of experiences of affliction. Ill health can be imbued with affect Ð loss, 
disappointment, pain, shame and fear Ð the depth of which cannot be met through 
ÔphysicalistÕ interpretations of illness (Harrington 2008:17). While biomedical 
attention is given to how an illness bears on the body physiologically Ð also through 
assessing how the body feels Ð the emotional reverberation of an ailment through the 
body often remains marginal. The affective and, in some cases, non-conscious 
emotional valence of ill health is, simultaneously, rendered medically meaningless.  
 
The affective clout of discourse 
Even though the biomedical discourse tends to be inattentive to the ways in which 
affect features in experiences of illness, the biomedical discourse is central in the 
constitution of affect in affliction. The affective clout of biomedicine is embodied in 
the symbolic as well as practical significance of biomedical diagnosis. The exclusion 
of an affliction from the confines of biomedical discourse Ð as is the case with, for 
example, medically unexplained symptoms or MUS Ð can have a profound effect on 
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people suffering with a condition that cannot be named and, consequently, 
biomedically legitimised and treated (Nettleton 2006; Jutel and Nettleton 2011; Jutel 
2012). A lack of a diagnosis often serves to connect an affliction with psychological 
and, within the context of western modernity, immaterial and fictitious origins. The 
meaning of an official diagnosis, as Nettleton (2006) argues, thus exceeds therapeutic 
and practical help, or access medical procedures. A diagnosis negotiates and, ideally, 
erases accusations of deception and delusion that dealing with an undiagnosed illness 
can give rise to. It is through diagnosis that the validity of the narrative and, 
ultimately, of the self of the ill person, is implicitly assessed (Nettleton 2006). As 
such, lack of diagnosis ties not only with diminished access to treatments but also 
with self-doubt and uncertainty. Accordingly, the lack of diagnosis can bring up deep-
seated anxiety over being a fraud, a hysteric or a time waster (Nettleton 2006:1170).  
 
The biomedical discourse Ð and what it may include and exclude Ð thus shapes the 
illness experience in important ways. Because of the meaning and legitimacy 
bestowed through diagnostic labels, diagnosis is highly relevant in the affective 
experience of ill health. Self-doubt, uncertainty, anxiety constitute affective 
experiences that are, at least partially, generated in relation to the endorsement and 
explanation offered, or denied, by biomedical institutions and experts. The power of 
the biomedical discourse is embodied in the affective clout that biomedical diagnosis 
and treatment possess in a society where science and scientific thinking hold enduring 
sway and where the scientific method is conceptualised as a primary means of 
accessing truth and reality.  
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However, while diagnosis can constitute a Ôroad mapÕ not only to treatment but also to 
legitimacy, diagnosis can also engender stigma (Jutel 2011:1; Nettleton 2006; 
Scrambler 2009). For example, in the case of conditions such as chronic fatigue 
syndrome Ð as is the case with MUS Ð what patients experience and understand as 
deeply disabling physical illness is readily cast as a stigmatizing psychological failing 
(Jutel 2011; Nettleton 2006). Mental illness diagnosis can be similarly stigmatizing 
and, as such, something avoided, and kept hidden (Scambler 2009; Pescosolido 2013).  
 
The affective significance of health-related stigma provides another avenue for 
conceptualizing the entwining of affect and discourse. Stigma draws from broader 
social and cultural meaning and can mark illness with myriad negative connotations 
(Scambler 2009; Goffman 1963; Pescosolido 2013; Link and Phelan 2014). To 
discuss stigma further, I turn to Sara AhmedÕs (2004a, 2004b, 2010) work on the 
capacity of negative affect to ÔstickÕ to people and issues. While AhmedÕs focus is on 
negative affect attached to otherness, her work can also be drawn on to reflect on 
health-related stigma. In AhmedÕs analysis (2004a, 2004b), some bodies are marked 
with negative affect as a result of historical ideas of otherness. Historical associations 
continue to influence social relations: Ô[t]he impressions we have of others, and the 
impressions left by others are shaped by histories that stickÕ (Ahmed 2004a:39). 
Associations that stick, furthermore, give rise to feelings that resonate through social 
relations as well as bind people together: Ôhow we feel about others is what aligns us 
with a collectiveÕ (Ahmed 2004:26). Negative affect directed at the other 
simultaneously fosters belonging to a community united in the exclusion of that 
which is considered other (Ahmed 2004a; see also Link and Phelan 2014).   
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Health-related stigma possesses a ÔstickyÕ (Ahmed 2004a, 2004b) quality. Stigma 
draws from the social and the historical and it evokes powerful feeling in those 
marked with the stigma, as well as in those without (Scambler 2009; Goffman 1963; 
Pescosolido 2013; Link and Phelan 2014). Like historically located ideas of otherness, 
stigma can establish boundaries and feed affect that excludes the other as well as 
binds the non-stigmatized together. For those marked with health-related stigma, 
however, the means of defining the self as opposed to a stigmatised character or 
category are more limited. Health-related stigma can, rather, ÔstickÕ to the self. The 
Ôloss of selfÕ (Charmaz 1983) associated with ill health can become pronounced, as 
well as more complex, through the ÔstickingÕ of stigma to the selfhood of the afflicted. 
Importantly, the affective power of health-related stigma is not fully captured through 
analyses that focus on stigma as a form of discourse. This is because feelings like 
shame and guilt can dwell in the body in a manner that bypasses conscious thought 
(Probyn 2004a). Yet, social meaning can feature prominently in the constitution of 
affect; stigma involves socially situated meaning that can generate ineffable negative 
affect reverberating through bodies. As such, as Lisa Blackman points out, Ô[n]ature 
and culture are not two separate distinct entities, but rather exist in a complex 
relationality that is contingent and mutable.Õ (Blackman 2008:34). The interlinking of 
social meaning with affective embodied experience captures the complex ways in 
which the social, the individual and the bodily continually entwine. 
  
Importantly for understanding the affective depth of health-related stigma, there is a 
particular truthfulness and cogency to embodied affect, in part, because it is 
embodied. Gut wrenching anxiety or cheeks burning with shame facilitate a sense of 
immediate, embodied affective reality that is difficult to challenge, and difficult to 
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ignore. Embodied intuition can, furthermore, readily be judged more correct and true 
than assessments arrived at through conscious reasoning (Kahneman 2011). As such, 
bodily experiences of shame and anxiety cannot easily be cognitively argued away. 
While affect may escape conscious awareness it would, however, be a mistake to 
ignore the manner in which the affective entwines with the discursive. Separating 
affect from discourse may, furthermore, inhibit attempts to understand the complex 
ways in which the social entwines with the emotional and the bodily in the 
constitution of, for example, experiences of health-related stigma.  I will now turn to 
the importance of affect in understanding medical encounters and the reproduction of 
inequality in medical interactions.  
 
Affect in medical encounters 
Social meanings that ÔstickÕ to identities (Ahmed 2004a, 2004b) are important in the 
medical sphere also because assumptions that ÔstickÕ can generate affect that 
facilitates as well as hampers access to medical resources. The entwining of identities, 
stereotypes and affect in medicine and health can capture the reproduction of both 
deep-seated inequality and of unacknowledged privilege.  
 
Assumptions pertaining to identities intertwine with norms and expectations related to 
behaviour, affect and emotion, also in the realms of health and illness. People 
inscribed with differing identities are, for example, assumed to cope with pain in 
varying manners, to exhibit hysteria to differing degrees, or to be more reliable in 
their accounts of illness (Ussher 2011; Mik-Meyer 2011; Barr 2008; Coyle 1999; 
Lupton 2012; Roberts 2011). What is deemed appropriate affect in medical situations 
is gendered with different expectations existing, for example, in regards to the 
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emotional labour performed by male and female medical workers (Wharton 2009; 
Hochschild 2003; Kittay 1999) but also by male and female patients (Mik-Meyer 
2011; Lupton 2012). Social class is, simultaneously, important in defining what 
constitutes normal and valuable emotionality. Ô[I]ntrospectiveness and reflexivityÕ 
that characterize middle-class emotional cultures (Illouz 2008:150) are, for example, 
normalized today. 
 
While expectations in relation to affect in illness entwine with social identities, these 
identities also exist in the context of the strengthening of neoliberal values over 
selfhood. Emotionality that is understood as appropriate centres on displays of self-
responsibility, emotional coping and acceptance, even the embracing of adversity 
(Illouz 2008; Ehrenreich 2010). Values such as these capture the importance of 
choice, autonomy and self-responsibility in the governance of todayÕs neoliberal 
subjects (Rose 1999; OÕGrady 2005). While different biomedical professions across 
cultures vary in their manner of dealing with emotions that surface in regards to 
affliction (Jutel 2012; Lupton 2012), making most of a difficult situation, following 
doctorÕs orders and smiling in the face of hardship (Ehrenreich 2010) constitute 
idealised emotional responses to ill health, particularly in the West.  
 
The often implicit entwining of affect with stereotypes related to social identities is 
present also in the doctor-patient relationship. Studies in medical sociology have long 
highlighted that medical professionalsÕ relationships with patients are shaped by 
assumptions pertaining to race and social class (van Ryn and Burke 2000; Coyle 
1999; Lupton 2012; Barr 2008; Shim 2010; Roberts 2011). PhysiciansÕ presumptions 
of, for example, a patientÕs capacity of adhering to a treatment regime and 
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understanding medical information reflect broader social and cultural stereotypes (van 
Ryn and Burke 2000; Barr 2008; Mik-Mayer 2011) as well as a patientÕs possession 
of what Shim (2010) terms Ôcultural health capital.Õ  
 
ShimÕs (2010) concept of Ôcultural health capitalÕ provides a starting point for 
reflecting on the entwining of affect with identities in the context of health and 
medicine. Following Bourdieu (1984), cultural capital refers to class-based skills and 
competencies that align Ôwith the standards of dominant institutionsÕ and that can, 
furthermore, Ôbe used to produce meaningful situational advantagesÕ (Calarco 
2011:863). Cultural health capital encompasses a Ôrepertoire of cultural skills, verbal 
and nonverbal competencies, and interactional styles that can influence health care 
interactionsÕ (Shim 2010:2). What tends to constitute cultural health capital today 
include Ôlinguistic facility, a proactive attitude toward accumulating knowledge, the 
ability to understand and use biomedical information, and an instrumental approach to 
disease management.Õ (Shim 2010:2). There is, as such, a connection between cultural 
health capital and economic as well as educational privilege (Shim 2010). Cultural 
health capital entwines with classed dispositions and resources, as well as captures the 
broader neoliberal ethos of self-responsibility. Cultural health capital and its capacity 
to foster advantages when navigating biomedical institutions also fortify the 
privileged position of biomedical knowledge in defining ill health. Simultaneously 
with upholding the power of the biomedical expert, cultural health capital positions a 
patient in possession of cultural health capital as an ally in the production of health.  
 
Much cultural health capital is interactional in character (Shim 2010). DoctorsÕ 
assessments of a patientÕs capacity to comprehend and comply intersect with an on-
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going, and often non-conscious, affective evaluation of individual patients, and of 
social identities. The meaning that ÔsticksÕ (Ahmed 2004s, 2004b) to certain people or 
issues thus resounds also through medical landscapes, silently shaping 
communication, diagnosis and treatment. While cultural health capital (Shim 2010) 
can be practically useful to patients possessing this form of cultural capital, 
ultimately, Ôcultural capital contributes to the accumulation and exercise of power and 
the maintenance of inequality.Õ (Shim 2010:2). In areas such as health and illness, the 
cultural capital that provides access to further advice and treatment reproduces 
privilege in the form of physical health and longevity.  
 
Cultural health capital (Shim 2010) captures social inequality also on a further, more 
affective level. Cultural health capital can be seen as important in generating patient 
experiences of worth. The possession of cultural health capital Ð or the alignment of 
oneÕs classed interactive style with what is valued within biomedical institutions Ð can 
translate to experiences of legitimacy and affirmation. Cultural health capital that 
often embodies an affinity of classed interactive styles (Shim 2010) and a congruence 
of class identities between doctors and patients can give rise to experiences of 
recognition. Recognition, in turn, facilitates feelings of self-assurance, self-respect 
and self-worth (Honneth 2001). While affect that is generated through experiences of 
recognition Ð for instance, feelings of validity and worth Ð may escape the biomedical 
framework for understanding disease, these same emotions can feature prominently in 
patient experiences of illness, and in patient responses to medical advice. The positive 
affect that relates to recognition can alleviate emotional challenges associated with ill 
health. Experiences of acceptance premised on the possession of cultural health 
capital can mediate the lack of legitimacy associated with, for example, the absence of 
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diagnosis. Importantly, however, recognition Ôis partly conditional upon behaviour 
and achievements, and these depend on access to valued goods and practicesÕ (Sayer 
2005:960). Cultural health capital (Shim 2010) entwines with affective experiences of 
worth and acceptance that, simultaneously, reproduce deep-seated inequality. Affect 
in medical encounters springs in relation to social assumptions. This affect suffuses 
the doctor-patient relationship and it can, furthermore, generate benefits such as 
access to treatment, advice, worth and validity. That class-based cultural 
competencies subtly facilitate access to resources for health can also serve to generate 
further affective experience: feelings such as shame and guilt among the privileged, 
and anger among the excluded.  
 
Embodied affect 
So far, I have argued that affective experience, also in affliction, entwines with 
discourse and socially generated meaning. I have also outlined the affective relevance 
of social perceptions of identities, and the significance of forms of capital such as 
Ôcultural health capitalÕ (Shim 2010) in the generation of affect that can shape medical 
encounters and patient access to not only treatment but also worth. I now want to 
extend these examples of the entwining of affect with discourse and social meaning to 
develop further understanding into how affect saturates affliction. In order to do this, 
it is important to focus on the body and on the manner in which affect makes itself 
present as embodied feeling.  
 
The body has been argued to constitute Ôthe unproblematic medium through which I 
experience lifeÕ (Leder and Krucoff 2008:322)
ii
. However, oneÕs relationship with the 
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body changes in the face of ill health. Ill bodies deal with, for example, pain and 
irritation, and lost control and function. The bodily discomfort that often characterises 
ill health encompasses ontological significance; feeling in the body brought on by 
illness can make the body present: Ôbodies, at the most general level, become most 
conscious of themselves when they encounter ÔresistanceÕ or ÔdifficultiesÕ of various 
kindsÕ (Williams and Bendelow 1998:159). The experience of the ill body often 
captures changes in physiological functioning, but it also entails important affective 
dimensions. The affect in affliction is embodied beyond biomedical understandings of 
the physiological roots of disease. Affective experience Ð feelings of, for example, 
shame, anxiety, embarrassment and expectation Ð dwell in the body and can, 
moreover, feature prominently in the lived experience of illness. 
 
To make further sense of bodily affect that often accompanies affliction, I turn to 
affective neuroscience. Literature into affect that is associated with neuroscientist 
Antonio Damasio conceptualises affect in terms of bodily feedback loops that 
emergent situations can call upon (Cromby 2007a, 2007b; Wetherell 2012). Damasio, 
as Wetherell (2012:30) notes, Ôformulates affect as the impress of alterations rippling 
through the body, registered as differences from average statesÕ. In DamasioÕs (1994) 
assessment, events and encounters can revisit and rehearse prior affective experience, 
shading situations with their specific emotional hue. Upon encountering a relevant Ð 
conscious or non-conscious Ð stimulus, earlier affective experience can be rehearsed 
in the body. Through what Damasio (1994) names Ôsomatic markersÕ, body states 
associated with past experience Ôcan get momentarily reconstituted in feedback loops 
between brain and body.Õ (Cromby 2007a:101). The body, furthermore, can respond 
as if an actual stimuli is appearing even when a physiological response relating to an 
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event results from internal rather than external stimulus (Wetherell 2012:35). A 
similar idea is outlined also by Kahneman (2011) in his discussion into Ôassociative 
activationÕ. Upon encountering a relevant stimulus, the body responds Ôin an 
attenuated replica of a reaction to the real thingÕ (Kahneman 2011:51). That emerging 
events can call on Ôsomatic markersÕ or rehearse existing associations, ultimately, 
captures the interdependency of cognition and affect (Damasio 1994, 1999) as well as 
the complex and continual entwining of prior experience and social meaning with 
affect, cognition and embodiment (Kahneman 2011). 
 
However, while DamasioÕs understanding of Ôthe fundamental unity of mind and 
body’ (Cromby 2007b:156) is appealing, there are problems to DamasioÕs approach. 
DamasioÕs view of the Ôaffective automaticityÕ of the body (Papoulias and Callard 
2010:41) builds on the idea that Ôhumans are primed to respond strongly to particular 
contexts, and our emotional responses are triggered by perceptions in the here and 
now of ÔmeaningsÕ that have been laid down by evolution.Õ (Wetherell 2012:38). 
However, Ôemotion is not an automatic (mechanical) fully formed response to 
stimulusÕ (Burkitt 2014:85). Rather, affect emerges in context and in relation to other 
people: Ôpeople frequently explicitly look to the situation and to others around 
them to decide whether it is excitement, anger or fear they could be feeling.’ 
(Wetherell 2012:41; see also Burkitt 2014; Cromby 2007b). Despite these 
problems, there is potential in neuroscientific formulations to help make sense of 
affect in affliction.  
 
The affect generated in relation to encounters that rehearse existing associative 
connections is inescapably physiological as it is embodied in the haptic, kinaesthetic 
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or vestibular reactions akin to the responses generated in relation to an earlier 
affective event (Cromby 2007a:101-2; Wetherell 2012; Damasio 1994; Kahneman 
2011). The physicality of affect, together with the potential for past affective 
experience to resound through the body long after the original event, is also important 
for further understanding the illness experience. The affective experience of affliction 
can remain not only in conscious memory but also as a memory inscribed in the body. 
Even non-related events and encounters can, furthermore, draw upon and revive past 
bodily responses. The affective echoes of illness that remain in the lives of those once 
afflicted are thus more than conscious. The affect associated with illness dwells in, 
and reverberates through, bodily systems. When the memory of ill health Ð an 
association connected with an illness experience Ð is called upon, the body reacts and 
an embodied affective experience emerges. The affect unfolding can, furthermore, Ôbe 
induced in a nonconscious manner and thus appear to the conscious self as seemingly 
unmotivated.Õ (Damasio 1999:48). A long past affliction can, as such, revisit us on the 
level of embodied feeling without a trigger that can easily be identified. However, 
rather than something automatic, this process is shaped in relation to complex 
individual, social and cultural meaning (Burkitt 2014). 
 
In the context of ill health, the associations called upon can, for example, involve the 
experience of exclusion of oneÕs affliction from the confines of the biomedical 
discourse. A missing diagnosis, while practical as well as related to feelings of worth 
and legitimacy (Nettleton 2006) is also entwined with the generation of embodied 
affect, also long past the original experience. This affect surfaces in the body but it 
also relates to all that diagnosis can encompass: certainty, restitution, or stigma  (Jutel 
2011). Health-related stigma that is socially generated can also enable affective 
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associations to develop in individual bodies. Shame engendered in relation to stigma 
can remain inscribed in the body. This shame echoes through bodily systems in a 
manner that often escapes conscious thought. The capacity of affect to remain elusive 
to conscious reflection makes recognising social categories that underlie feelings such 
as shame particularly challenging. It is, as such, tempting to conceptualize affect as 
existing outside discourse. The manner in which associations can generate 
physiological as well as emotional responses, furthermore, marks the affective 
experience with considerable depth and truthfulness (Kahneman 2011). Affect 
saturating the body lends the experience additional weight and reality. 
 
The unfolding of affective experience in relation to socially-generated associations 
can also reverberate through the doctor-patient relationship. A patient possessing the 
Ôcognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral resourcesÕ (Shim 2010:2) that constitute 
cultural health capital may, as Shim notes, Ôinspire more earnest efforts by their 
clinicians to give them additional information, resources, and skills.Õ (Shim 2010:8). 
Social meaning continually imbues affect that, in turn, shapes medical encounters. 
Subtle affective judgements made on the basis of perceived patient character can be 
powerful in reproducing inequality. Simultaneously, patientsÕ views of providers are 
shaded by affect capturing histories of, for example, exclusion and marginalization.  
 
Healing affect 
While affliction can be saturated with negative bodily affect, the generation of 
wellness is also often permeated by affect: by cautious hope that an affliction may be 
resolved, by joy in rediscovering bodily function, by trepidation that ill health may 
return. These affective experiences inhere in the body that can feel a surge of 
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embodied optimism and pleasure; a belief that things can get better resonates in the 
body that can, literally, feel lifted. The impact of positive affect can, furthermore, 
transcend simply feeling lifted as positive affect can result in changes in physiology, 
including the immune system (Segerstrom and Sephton 2010)
iii
.  
 
However, if the illness experience entails culturally and individually shaped negative 
affect resonating through in the body Ð in addition to the existence of a biomedically 
defined pathology Ð then a part of the process experienced as healing involves the 
emergence of different kind of bodily affect. Healing experience can be 
conceptualised as the rise of positive affect as something other than pain, loss or 
shame is inscribed in the body. The inscription of positive affect in the body is an 
important, albeit poorly understood, aspect of many health practices. Studies into 
health practices that give rise to healing despite limited evidence of scientific efficacy 
provide a tentative starting point for reflecting on experiences of healing outside the 
biomedical framework. For example, complementary and alternative medicines often 
lack evidence of scientific efficacy yet these practices have been found to engender 
healing, including feelings ranging Ôfrom increased bodily awareness to a sense of 
bodily mastery.Õ (Baarts and Pedersen 2009:729). 
 
Some of the healing accomplished in complementary and alternative medicines is 
generated through touch. Many clients of complementary health practitioners 
experience touch as particularly important and healing (Baarts and Pedersen 2010; 
Sointu 2012, 2013). The healing prowess of touch relates to the capacity of touch that 
is wanted and accepted to Ôreaffirm the connection between self and other that may 
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have been disrupted by the pain, incapacities, and disfigurements of illnessÕ (Leder 
and Krucoff 2008:324). Touch that is experienced as healing can be understood as 
meaningful in its capacity to elicit positive bodily responses in two ways. First, 
healing touch can break associations that may have emerged in relation to, for 
example, pain or limitation. Second, touch can help to generate new associations that 
can remain inscribed in bodily systems. Thus, just as ill health can be seen to 
encompass the inscription of negative affect in the body, processes of healing can also 
mark bodily systems and result in the emergence of affect that is felt to indicate the 
elision of illness and the return of health.  
 
Conclusion 
While Ôthe belief that affect is independent of signification and meaningÕ unifies 
much theorizing into affect (Leys 2011:443), this paper has sought to underscore the 
significance of discourse in the generation of affect and to highlight the complex 
manner in which social meaning and emotion entwine in illness, medicine and 
healing. The affect saturating illness is constituted in relation to relevant discourses 
even if the illness experience cannot be reduced to these same discourses. Illness, 
health and healing all involve more than discursive meaning marking forms of 
affliction; paying attention to the discursive production of illness, while enormously 
important, cannot alone capture what it feels like to suffer from ill health. 
Simultaneously, discourse Ð for example, social ideas of stigma Ð suffuse affective 
experience. As a result, the full extent of living with a stigmatising condition cannot 
be grasped without paying attention to the entwining of the social with the bodily and 
the emotional.  
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Even though the biomedical discourse pays limited attention to affect emerging in 
experiences of illness, the biomedical discourse is deeply significant in the 
constitution of affect in affliction. Social meaning that is attached to conditions carries 
affective weight. As the prowess of diagnosis and health-related stigma indicates, 
social meaning saturates the very fabric of our being. Ultimately, the separation 
between the body and discourse limits our understanding of human experience. 
Affective neuroscience offers a tentative, even if problematic, avenue for 
conceptualising how previous experience as well as socially located meaning resound 
through bodily systems, shaping experiences of affliction, also long after biomedical 
health has been regained.  
 
The entwining of affective experience with social meaning is important beyond 
analysing the illness experience. If we appreciate affect as capturing social meaning, 
social identities also matter in the generation of forms of affect. In the realms of 
health, illness and medicine, the veiled manner in which affect connects with 
stereotypes related to social identities acquires great importance; affective judgement 
can play a role in the subtle and often non-conscious reproduction of both privilege 
and disadvantage.    
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i This is not to say that emotion is simply ignored in biomedical settings. Nursing 
professions are, for example, often charged with care of the patientsÕ body and 
emotions (Lupton 2012; Stacey 1997).  
ii The general invisibility of embodiment is, however, patterned according to social 
identities including class and gender. For example, according to Stacey, ‘self‐
scrutiny and self‐surveillance are practically ‘second nature’ to femininity’ 
(Stacey 1997:196). The self‐scrutiny associated with femininities extends also 
the body.  
iii While there are indications that positive affect may positively influence health, 
the study of positive affect and health is plagued by difficulty. For example, 
positive affect may mean different things across cultures (Cohen and Pressman 
2006). It is, furthermore, difficult to assess whether it is positive affect or the 
lack of negative affect that improves health (Cohen and Pressman 2006:124). 
